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The  Turkish  economy  was  hit  by  two  crises  in  the  last  decade.  The  first one, 
which attracted surprisingly limited international interest, occurred at the beginning of 1994, 
at which time there was a managed float.
1 The  second  crisis,  preceded  by  financial 
turmoil,  erupted  in  the  second  half  of November 2000 in the midst of a stabilization 
program based on the exchange rate. In response to the turmoil, a new letter of intent 
was  presented  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  by  the  government,  which 
calmed market pressure. However, at the end of December average interest rates-both 
the overnight and secondary market bond rates-were almost four times higher than levels at 
the beginning of November and more than five times higher than the preannounced (at the 
outset of the 2000-02 program) year-end depreciation rate of the lira. This unsustainable 
situation ended on February 19, 2001, when Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit announced that 
there was a severe political crisis (without naming a specific cause), which had ignited an 
equally  serious  economic  crisis  in  the  highly  sensitive  markets.  The  markets  were 
already  jittery  due  to  what  had  happened  at  the  end  of  the  preceding  year.  On  that 
February  day,  overnight  rates  jumped  to  unprecedented  levels  of  6,200  percent  in 
uncompounded terms. Three days later the exchange rate system collapsed, and Turkey 
declared that it was going to implement a floating exchange rate system. 
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1 Özatay (2000), which analyzes the 1994 crisis, argues that despite the weak fundamentals of the period preceding the crisis, it could 
have been avoided. Turkey could have escaped the turmoil had there not been policy mistakes-mistakes that played a role in a series of 
shocks in the second half of 1993.   2 
The  crisis  of  2000–01,  which  was  more  severe  than  that  of  1994,  raises  a 
multitude of questions. What were the reasons behind the events of 2000–01? Why did the 
crisis erupt in the midst of the IMF-supported stabilization pro- gram? What are the lessons 
that can be drawn? By answering these questions, this paper concludes that the root cause 
of the crisis was the combination of a fragile banking sector and a set of triggering factors 
that made this fragility crystal clear. 
The banking sector’s weakness is noted in other studies of the recent Turkish crises. 
Akyüz  and  Boratav  point  to  shortcomings  in  the  design  of  the 2000–02 stabilization 
program  and  the  inadequacy  of  crisis  management  policies.
2  They  emphasize  the 
dependence  of  the  banking  sector’s  earnings  on  high-yielding  Treasury  bills,  thus 
rendering this sector highly vulnerable to disinflation. They further argue that since much 
of the fiscal adjustment was predicated on declines in nominal and real interest rates, the 
program was not compatible with this feature of the banking system. Alper focuses on 
the  events  that  occurred  at  the  end  of  2000.
3  He  argues  that  three  factors  were 
responsible for the crisis: the inability of the Turkish government to maintain the stream of 
good news and sustain capital inflows; not enough backing for the IMF program; and the 
“no sterilization” rule of the program, which led to interest rate undershooting in the first 
phase of the 2000 program. The banking sector’s fragility is a major theme of the analysis 
presented in Alper’s  work.  
Unlike  the  two  studies  mentioned  above,  this  paper  analyzes  the  structural 
characteristics of the Turkish banking system and provides a precise definition for banking 
sector fragility in the context of Turkey right before the crisis. This paper demonstrates that 
pressure  in  the  markets  increased  at  the  end  of  2000.  It  shows  that  although  the 
macroeconomic fundamentals were rather weak in 2000, the  prerequisites of the first-
generation  crisis  models  were  absent  (see  table  1  for  descriptions  of  crisis  model 
features).  The  role  of  self-fulfilling  prophecies  is  discussed,  and  an  analysis  of  the 
performance of the economy in the aftermath of the crisis is presented. 
Was the principal cause of the Turkish crisis a prospective deficit associated with 
implicit  bailout  guarantees  to  a  failing  banking  system?  Or  was  the  root cause of the 
problem financial fragility in the banking sector in the sense  of a third-generation crisis 
model? This paper analyzes the banking sector structure in the period preceding the crisis 
and  provides  strong  evidence  that  points  to  the  weakness  of  the  banking  sector. 
Furthermore, this paper identifies two types of dichotomy in the banking sector: between 
private and state banks and within the private banks. 
                                                
2 Akyüz and Boratav (2001). 
3 Alper (2001).   3 
Table 1. Salient Features of Crisis Models 
Crisis model                  Features 
First generation 
a. Controlled exchange rate. 
b. Loose fiscal policy, budget deficits are financed by printing money.  
c. Investors act on an unsustainable situation due to inconsistency between macroeconomic policies and 
the exchange rate regime. 
d. Efficient markets are assumed, and the regulatory and institutional structures of financial markets are 
not considered. 
e. No output decline in the post crisis period. 
f. Leading indicators available; gradual decline  in reserves and gradual increase in the interest rate 
differential. 
g. Natural collapse, given the policy framework; government is the culprit. 
Second generation  
a. Controlled exchange rate. 
b.  Macroeconomic policies and the exchange rate regime are not necessarily inconsistent, but some 
domestic concerns (unemployment and so on) on the part of policymakers may lead them to change 
the existing policy framework. 
c.  Despite sound monetary and fiscal policies, investor pessimism and the resultant portfolio shift from 
domestic  currency–denominated  assets  to  foreign  currency  bring  an  end  to  the  exchange  rate 
regime. 
d. Efficient markets are assumed; the regulatory and institutional structures of financial markets are not 
considered; balance sheets do not necessarily matter. 
e. Faster growth potential after the collapse.  
f.  No leading indicators available. 
g. No natural collapse; speculators are the culprits. 
Third generation  
a. Controlled exchange rate. 
b. Macroeconomic policies and the exchange rate regime are not necessarily inconsistent. 
c.  Despite sound monetary and fiscal policies, investor pessimism  regarding financial  soundness of 
banks and corporate sector lead to a portfolio shift from domestic currency–denominated assets to 
foreign currency that brings an end to the exchange rate regime. 
d.  Informationally  inefficient  markets  are  assumed;  weak  regulatory  and  institutional  structures  are 
considered for the country, allowing risk accumulation in bank and corporate sector balance sheets; 
balance sheets do matter. 
e.  Slower  growth  potential  after the collapse  due to damage  done in banking  and corporate sector 
balance sheets. 
f. No leading indicators available; possible to follow accumulation of risks in balance sheets, but change 
in risk perception of investors is hard to specify. 
g. No natural collapse. 
Source: Authors'  notes.   4 
What were the major distinctions between 1999 and 2000? 
￿￿As opposed to the managed floating exchange rate system of 1999, there was a 
pre-announced crawling peg system in 2000. 
￿￿The current account registered a record high level of deficit in 2000. 
￿￿Given a weak banking system, delays in reforming the banking sector 
increased tensions in the markets in the second half of 2000. 
￿￿A takeover of some of the private banks, starting in October 2000—and, at the 
same time, sensational criminal investigations of some bankers—made it clear 
that  the  banking  system  was  not  homogenous,  but  rather  dichotomized  as 
“good” and “bad” banks. This intensified rumors about which banker or bank 
was  next  in  the  line  for  investigation.  As  a  result,  in  the  second  half  of 
November 2000 good banks closed their credit lines to bad banks. This paper 
argues that the first two differences listed above were not sufficient to trigger the 
crisis. The main igniting factors were the delays in reforming the banking sector 
and the actions that caused the dichotomy in the banking sector to come to the 
surface. 
Identifying the Crisis 
In February 1990 Turkey applied to the IMF for full convertibility of the lira. Up to 
January 2000, a managed floating exchange rate system was operative. At  the  end  of 
1999,  Turkey  signed  a  standby  agreement  with  the  IMF  and  started  to  implement  a 
stabilization program, a pillar of which was a pre- announced, crawling peg exchange rate 
regime. The novelty of this exchange rate regime was that both the exit strategy and date 
of exit were known publicly at the very beginning of the program. It was announced at the 
agreement’s  signing that after eighteen months the exchange rate would be allowed to 
fluctuate in a continuously widening band. However, after a sky-high overnight rate (as 
high as 6,200 percent in uncompounded terms) and a huge decline in the foreign exchange 
reserves of the Central Bank of Turkey, on February 22, 2001 (just four months before the 
exit day) the exchange rate system collapsed and the central bank declared that it would 
allow the lira to float freely. By this announcement, the dollar rate jumped from a level of 
685,000 liras to 958,000 liras in one day. 
   5 
Figure 1 shows the pressure in the markets based on an ad hoc exchange market 
pressure index, along with its mean and mean plus two standard deviations, which are 
indicated by horizontal lines. As advocated by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz as well as 
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco, this pressure index is a weighted average of monthly rates of 
changes of exchange rate, (the negative of) official reserves, and overnight rates for the 
January  1990  to  December  2001  period.
4  The  monthly  percentage  change  of  each 
variable is weighted by the inverse of its variance. There are two instances at which the index 
exceeds its mean plus two standard deviations: the first one is the February to April 1994 
period and the second is the February to April 2001 period. This result is robust to the types 
of weight used. Figure 1 does not indicate the first attack against the lira, which occurred at 
the end of November 2000, since the central bank’s defense of the lira was successful at 
that time. However, as a result of this attack, the central bank lost almost 20 percent of its 
foreign  exchange reserves,  while  the  average  overnight  rate  jumped  to  873  percent, 
again in uncompounded terms. To highlight the severity of this attack, the evolution of the 
individual  items  of  the  market  pressure  index  is  provided  in  figures  2  to  4.  Figure  2 
presents the dollar-lira rate from the first working day of 1999 to the last working day of 
2001. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the weighted average overnight rates in the same 
period.  Finally,  the  time  path  for  the weekly foreign exchange reserves of the central 
bank is demonstrated in figure 4. 
Fundamentals and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies 
The first- and second-generation models of currency crises may shed some light on 
the 2000–01 crisis but cannot fully explain what happened. For example, on the one hand, 
in  the  period  preceding  the  crisis,  the  public  sector borrowing requirement was very 
high. This brings to mind a first-generation type crisis. On the other hand, the public sector 
borrowing  requirement  was  mainly  financed  by  issuing  domestic  debt  rather  than  by 
inflation tax, which is at the core of such models. Moreover, corrective fiscal measures had 
already been taken. On the one hand, high levels of short-term public debt and a weak 
banking sector might have set the stage for a self-fulfilling attack, inducing speculators to 
anticipate  that  the government would not dare to increase interest rates to defend the 
currency. On the other hand, despite corrective measures the fundamentals were weak, 
output contracted sharply, and the fiscal policy was not expansionary in the aftermath of the 
crisis, contrary to what the second-generation models envisage. 
 
                                                
4 Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995); Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a).   6 
First-Generation Type Crisis? 
Early models of balance of payment crises, following Krugman as well as Flood 
and  Garber,  emphasize  continuous  deterioration  of  macroeconomic  fundamentals—
which  depletes  international  reserves  of  central  banks—as the main cause of currency 
collapses.
5  This  generally  materializes  through  reliance  upon  seigniorage  revenue  to 
finance public sector deficits. There comes a point in time when a rational economic agent 
will realize that a gradual  depletion  of  international  reserves  is  an  indicator  that  the 
prevailing  exchange  rate  regime  will  not  survive.  This  anticipation  triggers  a  sudden 
speculative attack on the currency to prevent excessive capital losses. The collapse of the 
exchange rate system is inevitable due to its incompatibility with loose monetary  policy. 
Table  2  provides  information  on  how  consolidated  budget deficits were financed in the 
1995–2001 period.
6 As table 2 indicates, the Central  Bank  of Turkey’s  lending was zero 
since  1997.  Moreover,  in  the  same period  base  money  creation  was  entirely  through 
foreign  exchange  reserve  buildup,  except  during  the  1998  Russian  crisis.  Table  3 
documents the evolution  of  the  three  main  items  of  the  central  bank’s  balance  sheet 
(namely net domestic assets, net foreign assets, and base money), along with the bank’s 
reserves. Hence the central bank’s resources did not finance the budget deficits in the period 
preceding the crisis. That is, the central element of the first-generation models was not on 
the stage. Two additional points should be noted. First, during the period analyzed, only in 
1999–2000  was  net  foreign  borrowing  positive.  Second,  domestic  debt  maturity  was 
considerably increased again in these last two years (see table 4). These two phenomena 
do not fit in a scenario where economic conditions are continuously deteriorating and the 
risk is continuously rising. 
It is evident from figures 3 and 4 that neither the increases in interest rate nor the 
reserve fall were gradual, but rather were sudden. The overnight rate was highly volatile 
throughout the first eleven months of 2000, in sharp contrast  to  what  had  happened  in 
the year before, and no upward trend was observed in 2000. At best, it can be said that 
overnight rates fluctuated around a constant mean of 40 percent, reaching 82 percent on 
November 15 and 873 percent on December 1. The evolution of the price of the Turkish 
Treasury  thirty-year  eurobond,  which  was  issued  on  January  11,  2000,  with  an initial 
                                                
5 Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984). 
6 The consolidated budget is a part of the public sector. In addition to the consolidated budget, the public sector covers state economic 
enterprises, special funds, and municipalities. Note that consolidated budget deficits have accounted for an important part of the public sector 
deficits since the early 1980s. 
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price of $98.45, is also illuminating in this respect. The downward trend in price began as late 
as September 6, after reaching a maximum level of $108.7 (see figure 5). 
Table 2: Financing of the Consolidated Budget Deficit, 1995-2001
a   
Percent of GNP 
   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 2001 
Public sector borrowing requirement  5.0  8.6  7.7  9.4  15.6  12.5 15.9 
Consolidated budget borrowing requirement  3.7  8.5  7.6  7.1  11.6  10.2 17.9
b 
   Net domestic borrowing  3.6  7.1  8.5  8.6  12.4  7.4 12.9 
   Net foreign borrowing  -1.0  -0.9  -1.5  -1.9  0.6  2.1 -2.5 
   Central Bank advances  1.2  1.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 
   Other
c  0.0  0.7  0.6  0.5  -1.4  0.6 7.4
b 
Source: Turkish Treasury, various issues of Main Economic Indicators. 
a. Consolidated  budget is a part of the public sector. In  addition  to the consolidated budget, public sector covers state economic 
enterprises, special funds, and municipalities. 
b. Includes interest liability of the Treasury to the state-owned banks that is partly rolled over. 
c. Includes such “financing” items as deferred payments. 
Table 3: Balance Sheet of the Central Bank, End-of Period Values, 1995-2001 
   Net domestic assets
a  Net foreign assets
b  Base money
c  Reserves
d 
   (trillions of lira)  (trillions of lira)  (trillions of lira)  (millions of dollars) 
1995  323  -6  317  12,391 
1996  335  275  610  16,273 
1997  142  988  1,130  18,419 
June 1998  -1,778  3,331  1,553  26,377 
1998  625  1,486  2,111  19,721 
June 1999  -899  3,526  2,627  21,521 
1999  -938  4,818  3,880  23,177 
June 2000  -1,741  6,372  4,631  24,547 
October 2000  -1,815  6,710  4,895  23,545 
2000  2,485  3,303  5,788  22,172 
2001  20,475  -12,672  7,803  18,787 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey, Electronic Data Delivery System, www.tcmb.gov.tr. 
a. Net domestic assets equals credit to public sector + government securities + credit to banking sector – public sector deposits + other. 
b. Net foreign assets equals foreign assets – foreign exchange liabilities to nonresidents – foreign exchange liabilities to banking sector. 
c. Base money equals net domestic assets + net foreign assets. 
d. International reserves. 
A  similar,  sudden  movement  for  reserves  was  also  observed. The  record high 
level for foreign exchange reserves was $26.4 billion at the end of June 1998. The impact 
of the Russian crisis drove down reserves to $19.7 billion at the end of the same year. 
After that the reserves followed an upward trend to the end of 1999, reaching a level of 
$23.2 billion. This trend was replaced by a fluctuation around a level of $24 billion in the 
second half of 2000, which in turn was halted by the eruption of Turkey’s financial turmoil. 
Just two days before the turmoil erupted, that is on November 17, 2000, the reserve level 
was $24.4 billion, which was almost equal to the maximum level observed since before   8 
the Russian crisis.
7  Hence in the periods preceding the crisis, prerequisites of the first-
generation models were absent. Namely, the public sector borrowing requirement was never 
met through the central bank’s resources, and no evidence existed that the crisis had been 
expected. 
Table 4: Main Fiscal and Economic Indicators,1995-2001 
Percent of GNP, except as indicated 
   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR)  5.0  8.6  7.7  9.4  15.6  12.5  15.9 
Duty losses of state banks  2.2  4.2  5.2  7.5  13.3  12.0  0.0 
PSBR + Duty losses of state banks  7.2  12.8  12.9  16.9  28.9  24.5  15.9 
Primary surplus  2.1  1.3  0.0  2.1  -1.9  3.8  6.7 
Consolidated budget deficit  3.7  8.5  7.6  7.1  11.6  10.2  17.9 
Consolidated budget interest payments  7.4  10.0  7.7  11.5  13.7  16.3  22.9 
   Domestic  6.1  8.9  6.7  10.5  12.6  15.0  20.9 
   Foreign  1.3  1.1  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.3  2.0 
Public debt
a  37.6  40.3  40.5  41.3  51.8  53.4  99.6 
   Domestic  14.6  18.5  20.2  21.7  29.3  29.0  68.1 
   Foreign  23.0  21.8  20.3  19.6  22.5  24.4  31.5 
Short-term public debt  8.0  10.2  8.1  10.9  4.1  2.1  11.1 
Treasury auction borrowing rate, average (percent)  124.2  132.2  107.4  115.5  104.6  38.2  99.6 
Consumer inflation (percent)               
   Avarage  89.0  80.2  85.7  84.6  64.9  54.9  54.4 
   End-year  76.0  79.8  99.1  69.7  68.8  39.0  68.5 
GNP growth rate (percent)  8.0  7.1  8.3  3.9  -6.1  6.3  -8.5 
Average maturity of borrowing in auctions (days)  188.0  186.6  393.5  235.1  502.3  426.8  146.3 
Source:  Turkish  Treasury,  various  issues  of  Main  Economic  Indicators;  Central  Bank  of  Turkey,  Electronic  Data  Delivery  System, 
www.tcmb.gov.tr. 
a. Debt stock figures are for the end of the year. Foreign debt is converted to domestic currency by means of the average annual exchange 
rate. Foreign debt stock for 2001 is for the third quarter. 
This does not change the fact that the fiscal fundamentals, examined in isolation, 
were indeed weak. However, one should note that the IMF-supported program aimed—
and indeed succeeded, to some extent—at providing an end to the then unsustainable fiscal 
policy. The program did this by mainly reversing the upward trends in the real interest rate on 
government  securities,  public  sector  borrowing  requirement,  and  domestic  debt  stock. 
Moreover, an important amount of primary surplus was registered in 2000 (see table 4). As 
evident in almost all economic dimensions, the 1999 fiscal performance was the worst in the 
1995–2001 period. Then, why did the crisis erupt at the end of 2000, instead of in 1999? 
 
                                                
7 For the evolution of daily international reserves, see table 12.   9 
Clearly, an analysis of fiscal indicators will not provide answers on the timing of the 
crisis. This should come as no surprise, since fiscal laxity does not necessarily end with a 
currency crisis. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, using data  from  the  Organization  for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries for the postwar period, state 
that they do not detect any link between  lack  of  fiscal  discipline  and  exchange  market 
turbulence.
8 Frankel and Rose, using annual observations for the 1971–92 period for 105 
countries,  analyze  117  different  crashes. They  report  that “neither  current  account  nor 
government budget deficits appear to play an important role in a typical crash.”
9 Sachs, 
Tornell,  and Velasco  examine  financial  events  following  the devaluation of the Mexican 
peso for a set of twenty emerging markets. They state, “as important as a country’s fiscal 
stance  may  be  in  theory,  however,  it  is  important  to  notice  that  irresponsible  fiscal 
behavior was not among the central causes of recent troubles.”
10 Do these observations 
suggest that there is  no  correlation  between poor fiscal  fundamentals  and a currency 
crisis? Sachs and others emphasize that countries with better fiscal performance had the 
chance to escape from any crisis.
11 Eichengreen and others state (as one of the plausible 
interpretations of their results) that only money-financed deficits may matter.
12 This is the 
crucial point, as demonstrated above, since the 1997 deficits were not financed by the 
central bank’s resources. 
Looking at table 5, it is evident that the lira was in an overvaluation trend against a 
basket of currencies from 1995. As of the end of September 2000, the real appreciation 
relative to 1995 was 14 percent, while for year-end 2000 it was 18 percent. Sachs, Tornell, 
and  Velasco  as  well  as  Frankel  and  Rose  demonstrate  that  one  of  the  predictors  of 
currency crises is real appreciation of domestic currency.
13 Note first, however, that at the 
start of the program it was  publicly  announced  that the crawling  peg system would be 
replaced in July 2001 by a relatively flexible exchange rate system, with increasing flexibility 
as time passed.
14 Second, the growth rate of the Turkish economy was, on average, very 
high in the 1995–97 period (that is, 7.8 percent), when half of the real appreciation was 
realized. The average growth rate of the 1995–2000 period was 4.6 percent. Hence the 
standard Balassa-Samuelson effect might be one of the reasons for the real appreciation. 
                                                
8 Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995). 
9 Frankel and Rose (1996, p. 365). 
10 Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a, p. 180). 
11 Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a). 
12 Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995). 
13 Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a); Frankel and Rose (1996). 
14 However, there are some skeptical views on this exit strategy. For a discussion of the role of the exit strategy in the crisis, see the meeting 
summary of “  NBER Program on Exchange Rate Crises in Emerging Markets: Turkey,”  held on July 18,  2001,  www.nber.org/crisis/ 
turkey.report.html.   10 
Table 5: Balance of Payments and Real Exchange Rate, 1995-2001 
Percent of GNP 
   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Current account balance  -1.4  -1.3  -1.4  1.0  -0.7  -4.9  2.4 
Net capital inflows  2.7  3.0  3.7  -0.4  2.5  4.7  -9.8 
   Short-term  2.2  1.5  0.0  0.7  0.4  2.0  -7.9 
   Direct investment  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.1  1.9 
   Portfolio investment  0.1  0.3  0.9  -3.4  1.8  0.5  -3.1 
   Other long-term  -0.1  0.9  2.5  1.9  0.2  2.1  -0.8 
Real exchange rate
a  96.9  100.0  110.5  107.8  108.7  118.2  107.0 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey, Electronic Data Delivery System, www.tcmb.gov.tr. 
a. Year-end values, 1995 average equals 100. An increase denotes real appreciation. Value for September 2000 is 114.0. 
Was the record high level of current account deficit the major reason behind the 
crisis?  The  literature  on  the  sustainability  of  current  account  balance stresses that in 
steady state the current account deficit should be less than the average growth rate of the 
economy times its net international debt as a share of  gross domestic  product (GDP). 
Calvo and Végh suggest that a maximum level of indebtedness is 80 percent of GDP, 
above  which  capital  markets  are  reluctant  to  further  extend  credit  to  developing 
countries.
15  Multiplying 80 percent by the average growth rate of the Turkish economy in 
the 1969–2000 period (4.4 percent) results in 3.5 percent, which is lower than the ratio of 
cur- rent account deficit to GDP registered in 2000. Hence based on this measure, the 
current account deficit was high. However, note that the deficit was a one-  off.  In  the 
preceding two years the current account was almost balanced. In addition, five other key 
points  should  be  noted.  First,  long  before  the  end  of  2000,  the  government  had 
announced  that  it  was  going  to  tighten  its  2001 budget to reduce the current account 
deficit. Second, one of the underlying reasons for the high deficit was real appreciation of the 
lira. As discussed above, Turkey was planning to pass to a more flexible exchange rate 
regime in July 2001. Third, a major cause of the deficit was the rise in crude petroleum prices. 
Fourth, the U.S. dollar value of Turkish exports declined due to the appreciation of U.S. 
dollar against major European currencies, as Europe is a main trading partner of Turkey. 
Fifth, among others, Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco, along with Frankel and Rose, find that 
the current account is a poor predictor of currency crises.
16 
To  summarize,  in  the  five-year  period  preceding  the  crisis, the  macroeconomic 
fundamentals of the last two years of the period were the worst. However, despite a record 
high level of current account deficit for 2000 and real appreciation of the lira, almost all of 
                                                
15 Calvo and Végh (1999). 
16 Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a); Frankel and Rose (1996).   11 
the indicators displayed a positive stance in 2000 compared to 1999. This positive stance 
may be attributed to the IMF- supported stabilization program. Again, one must ask why 
the  crisis  erupted  at  the  end  of  2000  and  not  in  1999.  The  absence  of  the  leading 
indicators of a first-generation type crisis, coupled with the vulnerability of the economy 
(despite an improving stance in macroeconomic fundamentals), suggests the possibility of 
a self-fulfilling crisis. 
Second-Generation Type Crisis? 
One of the main reasons the Turkish 2000–01 crisis is an interesting case study is 
that the high public sector borrowing requirement was mainly financed by the issuance of 
domestic debt in the period preceding the crisis. This financing  mechanism,  by  limiting 
excess money supply, prevented both a jump in the rate of inflation to higher levels and a 
continuous depletion in international reserves, leading to a first-generation type crisis. As is 
well documented else- where, domestic borrowing masks foreign exchange losses. The most 
important point, however, is that if the real interest rate exceeds the real growth rate of the 
economy and there is no offsetting primary surplus, then domestic debt financing is not 
stable. Sooner or later this process will come to an end, but the timing depends on actions 
of the debt market’s main actors, rendering the economy open to self-fulfilling attacks. 
One  can  imagine  a  situation  where  a  government  aims  to  implement  a 
stabilization plan, but, for example, postpones the plan due to a forthcoming election and 
continues  domestic  debt  financing.  Or  the  country  already  may  be  implementing  a 
stabilization plan that addresses fiscal imbalances, but the initial level of the deficit is at 
such a high level that it may only be feasible  to  realize  the  fiscal  discipline  gradually, 
which  means  that  debt financing should continue. Based on fundamentals, there is no 
natural collapse and hence such an economy does not deserve a first-generation type 
crisis. In the absence of speculative attacks, the prevailing exchange rate system can 
survive.  However,  second-generation  models  argue  that  exchange  rate  systems  can 
collapse, because of the attack of speculators who anticipate that the government would 
abstain from taking necessary measures to defend  the  currency  against  an  attack. A 
high public debt or high unemployment may lead to such anticipations. 
Does the scenario described above fit the Turkish case? Although it is difficult to 
answer this question based on what happened in the post crisis period, an answer can still 
be provided. There should not be an output decline in the aftermath of a crisis. As Krugman   12 
puts it, “if a speculative attack drives a currency off its peg, this does not imply a negative 
shock  to  employment  and  output.  Indeed,  in  this  case  the  contrary  should  be  true: 
because the policy constraint of a peg is removed, the result is actually positive for short-run 
macro-  economics.”
17  Evidently,  this  did  not  happen  in  Turkey.  The  economy  sharply 
contracted by 8.5 percent in 2001, after 6 percent growth in 2000. In a similar vein, Flood 
and Marion note that second-generation crisis models require that in the post crisis period 
there  should  be  expansionary  policies  that  validate  anticipations  of  speculators.
18  
However,  post crisis  policies  in  Turkey were not expansionary. On the contrary, in May 
2001  the Turkish  authorities  signed  a  new  standby  agreement  with  the  IMF,  and  the 
primary budget balance registered a record high level of surplus (see table 4). 
The discussion in this paper so far reduces the possibility of a second-generation 
currency crisis, thus necessitating a discussion of other explanations. Was the principal 
cause of the Turkish crisis a prospective deficit—in this case an additional deficit on top of 
the existing one—associated with implicit bailout guarantees to a failing banking system? 
Or was the root cause of the problem financial fragility in the banking sector in the sense 
of a third-generation model? Note that third-generation models give special importance to 
self-fulfilling prophecies, just as do second-generation models. Due to triggering events 
capital flows out of the country, domestic currency depreciates, and either the banking or 
the corporate sector—or both—collapse, pushing the economy into a deep recession. The 
collapse in the banking or the corporate sector (or both) is due to financial weakness in 
balance sheets. 
Banking Sector 
There  is  plenty  of  evidence  regarding  risk  accumulation  in Turkish  commercial 
bank balance sheets. It has been shown in this paper that in the period preceding the crisis, 
the nature of risk accumulation in the banking system was not homogeneous throughout 
the system. Two different types of dichotomy were observed: first, the dichotomy between 
private and state banks, and second, the dichotomy within the private banking industry. 
Banking Sector Vulnerability 
During a crisis period, a central bank will find itself a lender of last resort for banks 
and hence its foreign exchange reserves should be compared with liquid liabilities of the 
banking sector. This is especially important during an exchange rate–based stabilization 
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program. Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco emphasize that even if fundamentals are wrong, a 
speculative  crisis  is  less  likely  to  occur  when  there  is  no  problem  with  international 
liquidity.
19 This paper uses two alternative definitions of total liquid liabilities of the banking 
sector.  The  first  one  is  M2YR,  which  is  the  sum  of  currency  in  circulation,  domestic 
currency–denominated  deposits,  foreign  currency–denominated  deposits,  and 
repurchase agreements (repos) of commercial banks.
20 In the second definition, M1YRS, 
instead of all deposits regardless of their maturity, only deposits with maturity less than or 
equal to one month are considered. Two alternative reserve definitions are used. The first 
one is the official reserves, whereas the second one is the sum of the official reserves and 
the reserves of the commercial banks. 
The first four rows of table 6 provide data for alternative definitions of the ratio of 
total  liquid  liabilities  of  the  banking  sector  to  foreign  exchange reserves.  No  matter 
which definition is  used,  the  conclusion  remains the same. Liquidity ratios were stable 
up until November 2000 and only a slight deterioration materialized before February 2001. 
Moreover,  the  magnitudes  of alternative ratios are small compared to those of crisis 
countries. For example, Sachs and others report that a similar ratio took a value of 7 in 
Mexico in mid-1994 and a value of 10 just before the Mexican crisis.
21 Calvo notes that 
the ratio was in the range of 2 to 3 for noncrisis countries such as Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia,  and  Uruguay.
22    Chang  and  Velasco  argue  that  the Asian-5  countries— 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thai- land—had a problem of international 
illiquidity when the Southeast Asian crisis  started.
23 The  ratio  of  M2  to  reserves  was 
stable  at  high  levels  (or increasing) in each of these countries except Thailand, which 
was  a  special  case,  as  demonstrated  by  Chang  and  Velasco.  According  to  their 
calculations, the ratio of M2 to reserves was 6.5 in Korea as well as Indonesia, and 4.5 in 
the Philippines. They also note that the same ratio was about 3.4 in the then noncrisis 






                                                
19 Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a). 
20 In Turkey repos are widely used by commercial banks as a retail instrument for government debt instrument portfolios. Average maturity of 
repos is rather short, usually less than a month. Their importance in the liability structure of banks is discussed below. 
21 Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996b). 
22 Calvo (1994). 
23 Chang and Velasco (1998a).   14 
Table 6. Banking Sector Short-Term Liabilities as a Multiple of International 
Reserves and the Evaluation of Credit Stock 
   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
a  2000  2001 
M1YRS / Central Bank reserves
b  1.85  1.76  1.81  1.75  1.49  1.87  2.22  1.78 
M1YRS / Total reserves
c  1.04  1.21  1.28  1.21  1.05  1.28  1.46  1.04 
M2YR / Central Bank reserves
d  3.57  3.48  3.39  3.64  3.53  3.69  4.16  3.98 
M2YR / Total reserves  2.01  2.39  2.40  2.52  2.47  2.52  2.73  2.32 
Credit / GNP (percent)  20.4  23.9  26.2  20.8  20.7  21.0  21.1  18.2 
Real credit growth (percent)  18.6  24.6  7.7  -14.7  -13.6  17.4  17.4  -28.2 
Consumer credit / Total credit (percent)  3.7  4.4  5.6  6.3  6.2  17.5  17.4  7.1 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey, Electronic Data Delivery System, www.tcmb.gov.tr.  
a. Values for end of September 2000. 
b. M1YRS = M1 + repos + foreign currency demand deposits + domestic and foreign currency saving deposits with maturity one month 
or less. 
c. Total reserves = central bank reserves + reserves of commercial banks.  
d. M2YR = M2 + foreign currency deposits + repos. 
Table 6 also provides data on the ratio of total loans of the banking sector to GNP, 
as well as the real growth rate of the loan portfolio. These indicators are sometimes used as 
proxies for the banking sector’s credit quality. It is argued that rapid credit growth is a signal of 
increasing credit risk for the banks. It is clear from these data that credit growth in Turkey 
in 2000 was rather high. However, note that a similar phenomenon was also observed in 
the noncrisis years, especially in the 1995–97 period. Neither the liquidity ratios nor the 
credit growth figures justify a crisis. The values they attain are not significantly different 
than in the noncrisis periods. This necessitates a closer look at the banking sector and the 
Turkish policy experience after 1999. 
This paper now turns to the evolution of more direct measures regarding the risk 
exposure of domestic commercial banks. Table 7 presents various indicators  of  the  risk 
exposure  of  the  banking  sector  in  the  December  1995– September 2001 period. The 
figures are reported in three groups, as indicators for the credit risk, foreign exchange risk, 
and interest rate risk. All of these indicators clearly show that the vulnerability of the banking 
sector to capital reversals increased throughout 2000. 
The ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans started to increase in 1998. Table 7 
gives  figures  for  the  whole  banking  system,  taking  public,  private,  Saving  Deposits 
Insurance  Fund  (SDIF)-controlled, and  foreign  banks together. Due to the growing 
number of banks taken under the control of the SDIF, this ratio reached 10.7 percent in 
December 1999.
24 This increase in nonperforming loans of the banks taken under SDIF 
control  raised  doubts  about  the  quality  of  both  information  disclosure  and  rule 
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enforcement.  Combined  with  the  delays  in  banking  reform, this  discrepancy in  figures 
immensely blurred the picture regarding the health of the private commercial banks. It 
was understood that the nonperforming loan ratio increases radically whenever a bank is 
taken  under  the  control  of  the  SDIF.  This  point  is  seen  more  clearly  when  the 
nonperforming loans of the SDIF-controlled banks are analyzed (see table 8). 
Table 7: Ratios of the Commercial Banking Sector, 1995-2001
a 
Percent, except as indicated 
   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
b  2000
c  2000
d  2000  2001
e 
Nonperforming loans / total loans  2.8  2.2  2.4  7.2  10.7  9.8  9.7  9.3  11.6  18.6 
Permanent assets / total assets  7.6  7.3  6.7  8.0  9.4  9.4  11.1  13.4  14.8  18.4 
FX assets / FX liabilities
f  90.6  93.6  89.6  84.9  79.4  74.3  73.0  71.6  75.9  81.0 
FX liabilities - FX assets (billion $)                     
    Excluding off balance sheet  3.0  2.5  5.0  8.4  13.2  17.2  19.2  20.9  17.4  12.4 
    Including off balance sheet  0.6  1.2  1.9  2.9  2.9  5.7  5.6  5.8  5.5  0.7 
Liquid FX assets / FX liabilities  44.8  44.6  41.0  39.5  40.0  36.6  35.2  34.4  35.9  38.3 
Liquid assets / Total sources
g  46.7  44.0  41.1  39.9  42.6  42.4  41.0  38.3  37.9  51.4 
Assets / Liabilities                     
 (with 3 months or shorter maturities)  n.a.  n.a.  45.8  45.7  46.3  40.8  41.8  43.9  39.9  43.9 
Share of deposits with 6 months or                     
 greater maturity in total deposits  26.1  26.6  24.7  22.9  28.2  19.8  18.7  19.3  15.1  11.6 
Repos / (Liabilities + repos)
h  5.1  8.1  12.8  10.4  9.6  12.0  11.4  10.9  11.3  6.1 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey; Banks Association of Turkey. 
n.a. Not available. 
a. End of period figures. 
b. Values for end of March 2000. 
c. Values for end of June 2000. 
d. Values for end of September 2000. 
e. Values for end of September 2001. 
f. FX denotes “foreign currency denominated”. 
g. Total sources = deposits + nondeposit funds. 
h. Repos had been recorded off the balance sheet since 2002. 
Table 8. Ratio of Nonperforming Loans to Loan Portfolio 
Percent 
  Date of takeover         
Bank  by the SDIF
a  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Sümerbank  December 21,1999  0,28  1,58  296,70  911,90 
Egebank  December 21,1999  0,56  2,35  211,11  205,30 
Esbank  December 21,1999  3,02  1,52  50,48  118,80 
Yurtbank  December 21,1999  0,22  5,66  1723,40  7554,60 
Yasarbank  December 21,1999  0,30  0,41  63,53  87,20 
Etibank  October 27,2000  0,95  0,67  0,00  14,13 
Bank Kapital  October 27,2000  0,95  6,25  6,76  1115,10 
Demirbank  December 06,2000  0,58  1,74  1,52  5,44 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey and Banking Regulation and Supervision Authority.  
a. SDIF = Savings Deposits Insurance Fund.   16 
In  the  period  preceding  the  crisis,  an  open  foreign  exchange  position  was  a 
structural feature of the Turkish banking system. This phenomenon is related  to  a  long 
history of high inflation and the inability of domestic banks to borrow long term in their own 
currency, as is discussed for developing countries in general by Goldfajn and Rigobon.
25 
Three different measures of currency risk are presented in table 7, namely, the ratio of foreign 
currency–denominated assets to foreign currency–denominated liabilities, the open foreign 
exchange position of the balance sheet, and the aggregated balance sheet, including 
off balance sheet items. They all point to a significant increase in the foreign exchange 
risk. While the total open foreign exchange position of the banking system was following an 
upward trend on the road to the crisis, the ratio of liquid foreign exchange–denominated 
assets to total foreign exchange–denominated liabilities was following the opposite trend. 
The latter made the system more vulnerable to sudden reversals. 
Maturity mismatch is another structural feature of the banking system in Turkey, 
due to the inability of domestic banks to borrow long term in the domes- tic currency. The 
ratios of assets to liabilities with matching maturities are reported in table 7. The figures 
show that the liabilities are more of a short- term nature, while the maturities of assets are 
longer. For example, for one unit of three-month liability, there is a 0.5 unit of three-month 
asset at the end of 1999. The picture becomes even worse when repos are taken into 
account. Note also the declining trend in the average maturity of total deposits, especially 
in 2000. 
Banking Sector Dichotomy: Private versus State Banks 
Despite the fact that both private and state banks had accumulated risks on the road 
to the crisis, the nature of their respective problems was different. On the asset side, the 
increasing size of duty loss accumulation of the state banks and the need to finance duty 
loss by short-term domestic bank liabilities were the  source  of  the  problem.
26  On  the 
liability  side,  the  ratio  of  lira  to  foreign exchange liabilities shows one major difference 
between the two groups. The ratio was much lower and, moreover, was decreasing for 
private banks. While the state banks were more open to interest rate risk, private ones 
were more prone to exchange rate risk. This is why the November 2000 crisis hit the state 
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26 After 1992 growing government debt instruments outstanding and the increasing financing needs of the Treasury led the government to 
finance some activities through loans taken from  state  banks.  Instead  of  repaying  the  principal  and  the  interest  accrued,  the Treasury 
allowed these nonperforming loans to be treated as performing loans by the state banks. The Treasury was directly controlling these banks, 
since they were state economic enterprises. In addition the Treasury, at that period, was also the banking supervision authority. This conflict of 
interest might have been one of the most important factors that led to duty loss accumulation. See table 4 for the importance of duty losses 
relative to other fiscal indicators.   17 
banks hardest and the effect of the currency collapse in February 2001 hit private banks. 
Table 9 gives a comparison of the balance sheet structures of private and state 
banks. In the case of the former, those that were taken under SDIF control in any of the 
periods reported are not taken into account. The figures are adjusted to include repos in 
the  balance  sheets.  There  are  two  major  interest-  earning  assets  in  the  Turkish 
banking  system:  commercial  loans  and government debt instruments. At the end of 
1999, for example, when Turkey launched its exchange rate–based stabilization program, 
the share of the government debt instruments portfolio in private commercial bank balance 
sheets  was  even  greater  than  the  loan  portfolio.  The  quality  of  the  government  debt 
instruments portfolio is directly related to the expectations regarding debt sustainability. This 
feature was increasing the vulnerability of bank balance sheets  to  concerns  about  the 
rollover possibility of the outstanding government debt instruments. Note that the situation in 
Turkey  is  not  directly  comparable  with  the  “bad”  private  loan  problems  of  East Asian 
commercial banks. In the case of the health of the Turkish private banking industry, smooth 
debt  rollover is  much more important. This issue needs to be understood to follow the 
factors triggering the crisis in November 2000. It is also important in discussing the balance 
sheet effects after the currency collapse. 
Table 9: Structural Characteristics of Private and State Banks, 1997-2001
a  








h  Private  113.72  119.28  82.52  93.26  102.49  111.39  130.70  139.00  144.97 
  State  86.24  87.86  66.27  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  59.22  n.a.  n.a. 
Repos / lira deposits  Private  123.36  83.27  106.61  95.23  93.73  105.41  53.48  23.62  25.37 
  State  22.49  19.07  13.64  30.29  28.67  29.50  27.27  55.36  41.52 
FX / lira deposits  Private  212.20  201.63  274.65  285.07  279.99  299.90  209.24  205.37  237.54 
  State  46.37  35.61  26.49  31.66  32.42  33.13  29.37  37.12  37.12 
Share of FX loans  Private  14.01  13.97  15.91  16.28  16.51  17.10  19.84  20.02  19.55 
  State  3.07  3.18  2.30  2.13  2.78  2.85  2.54  3.36  2.78 
 Share of interest earning assets  Private  67.80  63.66  63.22  60.79  61.88  60.92  58.05  53.95  52.73 
   State  36.63  35.34  28.85  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  31.88  n.a.  n.a. 
Share of accumulated duty losses  State  27.07  27.59  32.01  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  30.68  n.a.  n.a. 
Share of net worth  Private  9.13  9.87  11.29  12.16  12.83  13.85  12.39  11.25  9.65 
   State  5.38  3.85  3.80  3.78  3.50  3.20  2.69  3.78  3.50 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey. 
n.a. Not available. 
a. End of period data. 
b. Values for end of March 2000. 
c. Values for end of June 2000. 
d. Values for end of September 2000. 
e. Values for end of December 2000. 
f. Values for end of March 2001. 
g. Values for end of June 2001. 
h. GDI = Government debt instruments.   18 
The ratio of loan portfolio to government debt instrument portfolio is systematically 
lower  in  the  case  of  state  banks,  due  to  the  smaller  size  of  their  commercial  loan 
portfolios.  Moreover,  from  1997  to  2000,  this  ratio  continued  to  decline.  The  ratio  of 
interest  earning  assets  to  total  assets  shows  that  the  size  of  the  commercial  loan 
portfolios of state banks was rather small. Notice that the ratio for state banks is about half 
of the ratio for private banks. The reason for this discrepancy lies in the share of loans 
granted to the Treasury by state banks and later treated as a duty loss by the Treasury. The 
share of duty loss accumulated reached more than 30 percent of total assets. 
A  liability feature  of private commercial bank balance  sheets is  that it reflects 
the banks’ inability to borrow long term in domestic currency. The high ratio of repos to 
Turkish lira deposits is an indication of this. Banks used repos as a retail instrument to 
carry government debt instrument portfolios indirectly. However, all of the interest rate 
risk remains with the bank selling the repo contracts. The maturity of repos was much 
shorter than the maturity of lira deposits, which was around three months in 1999. While 
the ratio was on a declining trend for private banks after the November crisis, a reverse 
trend is observed for state banks. This amounts to saying that before the November 2000 
crisis, state banks could borrow at relatively longer maturities. With the interest rate hike 
after November, the growing ratio of repos to lira deposits raised the cost of funds to state 
banks enormously, requiring immediate action by the Treasury or bank regulators, or 
both, starting from May 2001. 
Another distinguishing feature of the private banks was their heavy reliance on the 
foreign exchange–denominated deposits of residents. The ratio of foreign exchange to lira 
deposits captures this feature. However, the maturity of foreign exchange deposits was also 
short, as in the case of lira deposits. Heavy reliance of private banks on foreign exchange 
deposits  made  them  more  vulnerable  to  international  illiquidity  crisis.  In  the  period 
preceding the crisis, private banks relied more on foreign exchange loans from international 
banks.  This  was  an  additional  factor  that  rendered  them  more  vulnerable  to  capital 
reversals. 
Banking Sector Dichotomy: Private Banks 
This  paper  now  turns  to  the  heterogeneity  of  the  private  domestic  commercial 
banking system. Regarding the banking crisis in Turkey, Eichengreen argues that the problem 
was  with  “a  number  of  mid-sized  banks  [that]  had  taken  highly-  leveraged  positions  in   19 
anticipation of continued declines in interest rates.”
27 It is true that the events leading to the 
actual crisis in November started with a mid- size bank, Demirbank, which had taken a highly 
leveraged position. The problem was  the very  risky mode of carrying a government debt 
instrument portfolio, which dates back to 1995 and became more acute over time. This risky 
mode of financing could also be found in the balance sheets of all private banks, as noted 
earlier. However, in the case of Demirbank this risky mode of financing led to enormous risk 
accumulation in its balance sheet when compared to the rest of the system. In this sense 
Demirbank  could  be  taken  as  a  prime  example  of  commercial  banks  carrying  large 
government  debt  instrument  portfolios.  Demirbank  was  heavily  concentrated  in  the 
government  debt  instrument  business  and  was  acting  as  a  market  maker  to  defend  its 
position. 
The sharp differences between Demirbank and private banks are reported in table 
10. First, for Demirbank, the ratio of government debt instrument port- folio to total assets 
was about twice the size of other private banks. Unlike other private banks, this bank was 
not active in traditional banking business of collecting deposits and distributing loans. 
Second, Demirbank was carrying its government debt instrument portfolio mainly 
through short-term repos. The ratio of repos to total government debt instrument portfolio 
was around 70 percent at year-end 1999 and 2000. While financing the government debt 
instrument portfolio—mainly by very short-term repos—the share of long-term government 
debt instruments in its total portfolio was also very high. This share jumped rather sharply 
just before the November 2000 crisis, increasing the vulnerability of the bank to an upward 
movement in interest rates. 
Third,  Demirbank  was  carrying  a  large,  long-term,  government  debt  instrument 
portfolio by financing its activities mostly through overnight borrowing from other banks, as 
table 10 demonstrates by the ratio of bank repos to total repos. Put differently, the fact that 
banks are more informed investors had made Demirbank more vulnerable. A potential cut 
of this short-term credit line would have jeopardized the viability of Demirbank. Indeed, this 
was what happened in November 2000. 
Fourth,  the  ratio  of  foreign  exchange  to  lira  liabilities  was  lower  in  the  case  of 
Demirbank,  as  most  of  its  activities  were  financed  by  lira  repos.  However,  the  sharp 
increase in this ratio at the beginning of 2000 and its sharp decline in the fourth quarter 
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require  further  elaboration.  The  rise  in  the  ratio  of  long-  term  government  debt 
instruments  to  total  government  debt  instruments juxtaposed this development. This 
seems to be related to the fact that structured financing products started to be used by 
the domestic banking system in general—and by Demirbank in particular. In the case of 
structured  loans, Turkish lira–denominated government debt  instruments  were used as 
collateral  against  foreign  borrowing,  and  were  accounted  for  as  long-term 
government debt instruments in the balance sheets. With increasing financing difficulties, 
Demirbank  seems  to  have  resorted  to  foreign  exchange  borrowing  by  using  domestic 
currency–denominated government debt instruments as collateral. In the case of structured 
loan agreements, there is a prespecified stop-loss level of government debt instruments’ 
interest  rates  to  start  the  automatic  sale  of  the  collateral  portfolio.  This  feature  of 
structured  loans  was instrumental in the massive sell-off in the debt market, accompanied 
by a massive demand for foreign exchange, in November 2000—right after the financing 
difficulties of Demirbank. The latter feature gave the crisis a systemic character. In the 
end, difficulties at a single, midsize bank turned into a crisis for the whole debt market. The 
situation  then  exploded  into  a  crisis  for  the  whole  domestic  banking  system,  since 
government debt instrument portfolios were an important interest earning asset in domestic 
bank balance sheets. 
Table 10: Dichotomy in the Private Banking Sector: Demirbank versus Others
a 








h / Total assets  Sector  31.72  29.03  34.64  31.45  30.56  28.82  25.16  22.57  21.52 
  Demirbank  58.54  57.09  65.12  58.33  54.68  63.53  67.50  74.98  67.63 
Repos / GDI + Repos  Sector  60.24  48.51  38.66  37.51  38.06  40.94  33.04  17.73  20.75 
  Demirbank  68.30  57.16  69.48  66.40  59.10  64.81  70.69  52.60  19.57 
Bank Repos / Total Repos  Sector  20.64  22.51  19.09  14.93  28.57  21.08  5.48  0.24  6.62 
  Demirbank  29.02  24.08  41.97  32.49  33.25  23.93  48.31  0.15  20.73 
Share of interest earning assets  Sector  67.80  63.66  63.22  60.79  61.88  60.92  58.05  53.95  52.73 
   Demirbank  77.44  72.86  79.57  73.57  78.14  85.34  93.21  98.06  84.60 
Long-term GDI / GDI   Sector  9.95  8.37  18.43  20.30  25.12  36.62  44.98  62.63  69.26 
  Demirbank  23.49  27.15  27.15  28.83  36.41  45.33  12.79  22.38  27.43 
FX / lira liabilities  Sector  135.48  155.11  194.23  213.31  213.21  219.72  219.47  262.14  279.32 
   Demirbank  43.59  109.89  69.41  88.14  112.63  73.78  36.91  53.08  91.62 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey. 
a. End of period values. 
b. Values for end of March 2000. 
c. Values for end of June 2000. 
d. Values for end of September 2000. 
e. Values for end of December 2000. 
f. Values for end of March 2001. 
g. Values for end of June 2001. 
h. GDI—Government debt instruments. 
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Third-Generation Type Crisis? 
This paper concludes that the Turkish financial system, which was dominated by 
banks, was vulnerable to spikes in both the exchange rate and the interest rate that a 
sudden capital reversal could cause. Moreover, this weak- ness sharply increased in 2000. 
Turkey’s banking sector problem was basically a result of the mechanism chosen to 
finance a very high public sector borrowing requirement. First, this led to an increase in 
government debt instruments, especially in the balance sheets of private banks. Second, it 
caused a significant deterioration in state- owned banks by accumulating duty losses. Risk 
accumulation in bank balance sheets,  in  order  to  carry  the  domestic  debt  stock, is  an 
important element of crisis dynamics. Due to excessive risks accumulated in their balance 
sheets, credit lines were cut off to some banks that were specifically acting as market 
makers in the government debt instruments market (and hence accumulating larger than 
average  GDI  portfolios).  Thus  the  banking  sector  problem  turned  into  a  debt  rollover 
problem, increasing interest rates. The rise in interest rates  changed the nature of the 
problem into a debt sustainability issue directly making rollover impossible. This happened 
despite the continuing fiscal discipline policy under an IMF-supported program. 
At  the  core  of  some  variants  of  the  third-generation  crisis  models  there  is the 
vulnerability  of  the  financial  system.
28  Despite  similarities,  the  Turkish crisis has some 
features that do not fit third-generation models, most notable being the high budget deficit, 
which  was  mainly  financed  by  domestic  debt. This feature renders useless one of the 
prescriptions of the variant of a third- generation model introduced by Krugman.
29 Krugman 
stresses the corporate sector balance sheet implications of a currency crisis, and the model 
he presents  suggests  fiscal  expansion  as  one  of  the  remedies  to  overcome  the  high 
exchange rate–low output equilibrium of the post crisis period. This is hardly a solution in an 
economy where the main concern of the economic agents was the sustainability of domestic 
public debt, as at least in the first ten months of 2001 in Turkey. 
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo argue that a principal cause of the 1997 Asian 
crisis was large, prospective deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing 
banking  systems.
30  Economic  agents  expect  that  these future deficits are going  to  be 
financed by money creation, which leads to a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regimes. 
The Turkish case also has some similarities with prospective deficits models. 
                                                
28 For example, see Chang and Velasco (1998b). 
29 Krugman (1999a and 1999b). 
30 Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001).   22 
Triggering Factors 
What  were  the  factors  igniting  the  crisis,  and  what  were  the  responses  of 
commercial  banks  to  these  factors? The  role  of  these  triggering  factors  in  the severe 
dichotomizations of the banking sector, which led to credit line cuts, is examined below, 
emphasizing that this dichotomy did not materialize overnight. There was already enough risk 
accumulated in bank balance sheets. The igniting factors worked as a catalyst, bringing this 
dichotomy to a severe conclusion, with credit line cuts as banks stopped trading with each 
other. Delays in structural reforms, especially the inability to design a transparent and viable 
banking reform strategy at the outset—and the unsystematic as well as piecemeal nature of 
the SDIF intervention in “bad” banks—exacerbated the problem. 
Structural Reforms Delayed 
Structural reforms constituted an important part of the standby agreement signed 
with  the  IMF. These  reforms  were  collected  under  six  headings  in  the  letter of intent: 
Pension  Reform;  Reform  in  Agriculture  Sector,  Tax  Policy  and  Administration,  Fiscal 
Management and Transparency, Privatization and the Capital Market, Strengthening the 
Banking Sector, and Banking Regulation. Hence the issue of banking reform was already 
considered in principle right at the outset of the agreement. 
The main problems were in the last three areas. Under the fiscal management and 
transparency heading, the government promised to close sixty-one budgetary  funds  to 
broaden  the  effective  coverage  of  the  budget  in  2000, whereas only twenty-seven of 
these funds were actually closed. The markets paid special attention to the privatization of 
the  telecom  sector.  The  discussions  on  this privatization  began as early as 1990, but 
several laws passed by the parliament since then were then rejected by the Supreme 
Court. The IMF insisted on passing a new law to enable Turk Telecom to act as a private 
entity by making it subject to the Turkish commercial code and establish a regulatory body 
for  this  sector.  There  were  sharp  differences  of  opinion  between  the  members of the 
government on this issue, and as a result the law was not drafted. Finally, the board of the 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency should have been named by the end of March 
2000  so  it  would  have  been  in  full  operation  by  the  end  of  August.  This  task  was 
accomplished  on August  31,  after a  five-month  delay,  increasing  concerns  about  the 
government’s intentions regarding manipulating the board and causing a credibility loss. 
In  addition  to  delays  in  implementation,  the  program’s  lack  of  political  and   23 
administrative leadership also contributed to uncertainty. The details of the program did 
not become public knowledge in a systematic manner. Especially  in  terms  of  banking 
reform,  this  lack  of  public  knowledge  was  detrimental,  contributing  to  severe 
dichotomy in the banking system and leading to credit line cuts. The announcement that 
the banking system had a problem,  without  any  detailed  and  systematic  program  to 
show how the authorities were thinking of solving the problem and with long periods of 
inaction exacerbated the problem of heterogeneity in the banking sector, leading to a 
halt in trading. 
SDIF Takeovers and Unending Court Cases 
Just before the 2000–02 program was put into action, five banks were taken over by 
the  SDIF,  on  December  21,  1999.  This  action  did  not  alleviate  the banking system’s 
problems. Two more banks were taken over by the SDIF on October 27, 2000. These last 
two  takeovers materialized only a  month after the Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency board was named. The last four months of 2000 were especially hard times for 
some  bankers.  In  September  2000,  police  initiated  a  criminal  investigation—code  name 
“Hurricane”— and  started  to  arrest  the  owners  and  executives  of  five  of  these  seven 
banks (see table 11). News about the arrested bankers, accompanied by videotapes and 
photographs of their arrest, were covered extensively by the media. This news was not 
limited  to  the  financial  section  of  newspapers  or  business  programming on television. 
Rather, the news made the front page and primetime. The media’s intense coverage of the 
arrests on this operation intensified rumors about who was going to be arrested next. Bankers 
acquired the nickname “tun nelers,” the idea behind which was the same as the “tunneling” 
concept  used  by  Johnson  and  others  regarding  newly  privatized  enterprises  in  post 
communist countries.
31 
All of these developments strengthened the idea that there was an immense problem 
in  the  private  banking  industry,  and  that  the  program  to  tackle  the  issue  was  not 
completed.  The  extensive  press  coverage  of  arrested  bankers itself contributed to the 
uncertainty regarding the future of the banking industry. It also raised doubts about the 
possible costs that would be incurred very shortly. Considering the cost of banking reform 
to the public purse and the use  of  government  debt  instruments  to  recapitalize  banks, 
concerns about future debt sustainability increased. These concerns intensified on the road 
                                                
31 Johnson and others (2000). The term tunneling, as used by Turkish media, refers to related lending much above regulatory limits and 
favorable treatment of companies that are owned by the owners of the banks.   24 
to the crisis. And the environment also contributed to severe polarization in the banking 
system between allegedly good and allegedly bad banks. 
Table 11. Banks Taken Over by the SDIF, 1999–2001a 
      Share in total assets as  Were any of the owners or 
Bank  Date of the takeover  of the takeover year   the executives arrested? 
Sumerbank  December 21, 1999  0.6  Yes, Oct.-Nov. 2000 
Egebank  December 21, 1999  0.6  Yes, Oct.-Nov. 2000 
Esbank  December 21, 1999  0.8  No 
Yasarbank  December 21, 1999  0.5  No 
Yurtbank  December 21, 1999  0.6  Yes, Oct.-Nov. 2000 
Etibank  October 27,2000  1.2  Yes, Oct.-Nov. 2000 
Bank Kapital  October 27,2000  0.3  Yes, Oct.-Nov. 2000 
Demirbank  December 06,2000  2.4  No 
Ulusalbank  February 28,2001  0.1  No 
Iktisat  Marc 15,2001  0.7  No 
Bayındırbank  July 10,2001  0.2  No 
EGS Bank  July 10,2001  0.5  No 
Sitebank  July 10,2001  0.1  No 
Kentbank  July 10,2001  1.0  No 
Toprakbank  November 30, 2001  1.0  No 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey, Banking Regulation and Supervision Authority, and various daily newspapers.  
a. SDIF = Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. 
Turbulence in November 2000 
The  banking  sector  fragility  made  life  very  difficult  for  those  banks  that  had 
desperately  chosen  to  borrow  in  short-term  maturity  and  lend  to  the  government  in 
relatively longer terms. Adding to the problem was the fact that state banks were suffering 
from duty losses. These state banks had been heavily dependent on overnight funds and 
found  themselves  in  a  position  where  they  could  not  conduct  business  as  usual. 
Demirbank could not borrow in the overnight market on October 20. So as not to exceed 
the  IMF  ceilings  on  net  domestic  assets,  the  Central  Bank  of  Turkey  did  not  lend  to 
Demirbank. This forced Demirbank either to sell part of its government securities portfolio 
or stop acting as a market maker in the government debt instrument market on the buying 
side (both of which led to similar market repercussions), causing an increase in secondary 
market  interest  rates. This marked the start of the first period in the crisis. The rise in 
interest rates to the “stop-loss” levels in structured foreign exchange–denominated loans 
started  a  new  wave  of  sell-  offs  of  government  debt  instruments.  Consequently, 
demand  for  foreign  currency  increased  sharply  as  lira-denominated  government  debt 
instruments were used as collateral for foreign exchange borrowing. Due to this sell-off, 
secondary market interest rates increased, further raising doubts about debt sustainability and   25 
the stability of the exchange rate–based stabilization program.  
This paper  divides the first attack period into three phases: November 20–21, 
November 22–29, and November 30–December 6. Note that this periodization depends on 
the changes in central bank policy. In the first phase the Central Bank of Turkey did not lend 
to problematic banks, while in the second one it did the opposite.
32 The sharp difference 
in the evolution of net domestic assets is noted in table 12. Though the domestic credit 
expansion helped to prevent interest rates from skyrocketing, at the same time, it increased 
the drain on international reserves. Note, further, that the magnitude of depletion of official 
reserves was greater than the magnitude of expansion in domestic credit creation, creating a 
reduction  in  base money.  Hence  the  second phase witnessed a further rise in interest 
rates. 
Mainly based on the drain on its international reserves and the reluctance of the 
regulation and supervision agency to address the root of the problem—that is, by taking 
over the system’s bad banks—the Central Bank of Turkey announced on November 30 
that it was going to keep its net domestic assets level constant. This marked the beginning 
of the third phase of the first attack period. Consequently, on that day the overnight rate 
jumped to 316 percent. This made life harder for state-owned banks, where there was a 
huge, accumulated  interest  rate  risk  potential.  The  next  day’s  headline  news  was  the 
middle-of-the-night negotiation with the IMF and the increased possibility of a  new  credit 
line.  This  news  notwithstanding,  the  overnight  rate  jumped  to 873 percent. Despite its 
announcement, on December 4 the central bank had to lend to a problematic bank to 
prevent that bank’s default. Two days later, that problematic bank, Demirbank, was taken 
over, and the IMF made it clear that it was going to support the program by opening a new 
credit line. The new letter of intent was made public on December 18, and four days later 
the central bank announced its new monetary program. Despite the fact that the former 
limits put on the central bank’s balance sheet by the IMF were changed, the path of the rate 
of  depreciation  of  Turkish  lira  was  not.  Because  of  the  agreement with the IMF, the 
reserve decline came to an end. Moreover, with the IMF’s support facility, official reserves 
jumped to a level of $28.2 billion from a low of $18.3 billion (see figure 4). These events 
helped to calm the markets. 
                                                
32 This asymmetric behavior was a matter of controversy. In the first phase Demirbank was the main problem. The reason behind such a policy 
was that the injection of liquidity would be a fruitless attempt, given the bank’s nonviability. Moreover, one of the main pillars of the2000–02 
program was the preannounced crawling peg exchange rate regime. Such a move would have exacerbated the attack. The correct policy 
should  have  been to  take over Demirbank immediately. However, the takeover did not occur until the late date of December 6. In the 
meantime, the difficulties of Demirbank turned into a systemic crisis, and the central bank had to change its policy.   26 
Final Eruption: February 19, 2001 
A new problem emerged in the aftermath of the November crisis: the inconsistency 
between the interest rate level and the preannounced rate of depreciation of the Turkish lira. 
This was related to questions regarding the Treasury’s ability to rollover debt, as the major 
market maker of government debt instruments was no longer in the picture. The upper limit 
of  the  annual  rate  of  depreciation of the lira against a basket of euros and dollars was 
announced as 12 percent  in  2001.  But  throughout  the  auctions  in  January  2001,  the 
Treasury was not able to borrow below 57 percent in annual compounded terms. In the first 
auction  of  February,  the  interest  rate  increased  to  70  percent.  That  was  clearly  an 
unsustainable situation. Either the interest rate should have declined to a level compatible 
with the rate of depreciation or the exchange rate regime should have collapsed. 
On  February  19,  after  a  National  Security  Council  meeting,  the  prime  minister 
declared that he and the president were in deep disagreement, without naming a specific 
cause. He added that the disagreement amounted to a very important political crisis. The 
prime minister’s announcement caused the overnight rate to skyrocket to 2,058 percent on 
February 20, followed by 4,019 percent on the following day (see table 12). On the date 
the  announcement was made, the banking sector rushed to foreign currency. Since the 
U.S. markets  were  closed  on  that  specific  date,  the  banking  sector  foreign  currency 
demand was not fully met by the central bank, which prevented a loss of $7.5 billion of 
reserves.
33 However, the depletion of reserves in the next two days and the interest rate 
level forced the government to accept the collapse of the crawling peg system on the night 
of February 21. Following the announcement that the lira would be allowed to float freely, 
the  dollar  exchange  rate  jumped  to  958,000  liras  from  a  level  of  685,000  liras.  The 
undersecretary of the Treasury and the governor of the central bank resigned, which was 










                                                
33 On this issue see Central Bank of Turkey (2001, p. 94).   27 
Table  12.  Balance  Sheet  of  the  Central  Bank,  Interest  and  Exchange  Rates,  
November–December 2000 and February 2001 
     Net domestic   Net foreign   Base     Overnight     Exchange  





e  Bond rate
f  rate 
Date    (trillions of lira)  (trillions of lira)  (trillions of lira)  (millions of dollars)  (percent)  (percent)  (dollar/lira) 
First attack period, 2000                
November 15  –1,828  7,092  5,264  24,161  81.5  40.8  681,799 
 16  –1,873  7,334  5,461  24,520  73.7  38.5  682,942 
 17  –1,866  7,273  5,407  24,433  34.4  40.1  683,645 
First phase                 
November 20  –2,035  7,108  5,073  24,185  45.5  42.1  686,461 
 21  –1,992  6,959  4,967  23,842  66.5  46.1  687,009 
Second phase                
November 22  –362  5,909  5,547  22,263  110.8  52.0  688,360 
 23  –1,357  5,950  4,593  22,284  85.5  49.4  688,849 
 24  –498  5,475  4,977  21,583  115.1  53.5  689,042 
 27  –523  5,258  4,735  21,291  80.5  50.3  689,213 
 28  233  4,336  4,569  20,080  184.5  67.7  685,762 
 29  1,162  3,649  4,811  19,161  160.8  79.0  682,883 
Third phase                
November 30  1,172  3,348  4,520  18,820  315.9  97.6  682,101 
December  1  1,094  3,422  4,516  18,942  873.1  84.1  681,032 
  4  1,832  2,958  4,790  18,299  782.5  131.4  676,239 
  5  1,707  2,812  4,519  18,285  363.2  71.3  679,404 
  6  1,597  3,134  4,731  18,633  182.7  73.9  678,875 
  7  1,096  3,608  4,704  19,267  119.6  74.7  675,379 
  8  1,045  3,762  4,807  19,624  94.7  88.9  677,108 
Second attack period, 2001                
February 15  –1,754  6,680  4,927  28,217  39.2  61.9  685,998 
 16  –1,547  6,649  5,102  27,943  40.3  63.4  685,039 
 19  –1,626  6,708  5,082  28,105  43.7  67.9  683,074 
 20  –1,300  5,687  4,387  26,739  2,057.7  25,514.7  688,001 
February 21  868  3,417  4,286  23,207  4,018.6  150.2  685,391 
 22  2,070  3,373  5,443  23,267  1,195.3  147.7  957,879 
 23  1,560  4,198  5,758  22,581  568.0  195.8  1,072,988 
 26  1,205  4,046  5,251  21,988  102.1  145.3  946,306 
 27  1,659  3,311  4,970  21,699  100.2  168.7  906,164 
  28  2,156  2,915  5,071  21,432  100.1  245.3  920,678 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey, Electronic Data Delivery System, www.tcmb.gov.tr. 
a. Net domestic assets = credit to public sector+government securities+credit to banking sector–public sector deposits+other. 
b. Net foreign assets = foreign assets–foreign exchange liabilities to nonresidents–foreign exchange liabilities to banking sector. 
c. Base money = net domestic assets + net foreign assets 
d. Reserves are international reserves. 
e. Overnight rate is the weighted average uncompounded rate. 
f. Bond rate is the compounded average secondary market rate. 
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Conclusions 
Analyzing  the  2000  data  in  isolation,  one  would  immediately  observe  poor 
macroeconomic performance. The public sector borrowing requirement, ratio of public debt 
to GNP, current account deficit, inflation level, and the ratio of the liabilities of the financial 
sector to official reserves were all high. Moreover, the lira was appreciated in real terms. 
However, this analysis would be a misleading  picture  of  the  Turkish  economy.  Turkey 
started to implement an IMF-supported program at the beginning of 2000. This program 
addressed macroeconomic imbalances and succeeded (to some extent) in reversing the 
negative trend. Relative to 1999, there was a sharp decline in both inflation and real interest 
rates as well as a significant increase in primary surplus. Consequently, the ratio of debt to 
GNP and the public sector borrowing requirement decreased. 
It is true that the rising current account deficit and real appreciation of the lira was a 
source of increasing concern. However, an important part of the cur- rent  account  deficit 
was  due  to  external  shocks—rising  oil  prices  and  appreciation  of  the U.S.  dollar 
against major European currencies. And, there was a built-in exit strategy from the crawling 
peg  system,  which  was  the  main  factor  behind  appreciation.  Moreover,  the  program 
envisaged a further fiscal tightening for 2001 that would have been one of the remedies for 
the current account problem. 
This paper argues that without a fragile banking system and triggering factors, the 
high current account deficit and real appreciation of the lira would not have been enough 
on their own to precipitate the 2000–01 crisis. There was risk accumulation in the banking 
system in the period preceding the crisis. For example, there was an increase in currency 
and  maturity  mismatches  as well as a rise in nonperforming loans. Hence the banking 
system was highly  vulnerable  to  capital  reversals.  However,  risk  accumulation  was  not 
homogenous  throughout  the  system.  There  were  two  different  types  of 
dichotomization: private versus state banks and within the private banks. While the state 
banks were more open to interest rate risk, private ones were more prone to exchange 
rate risk. Within the private banking system there were some midsize banks that were heavily 
concentrated in government debt instrument business. Moreover, they were carrying these 
instruments by borrowing in the extreme short term. 
Given  the  weakness  in  the  banking  system,  it  is  no  surprise  that  the  crisis 
triggering factors were closely related to the banking sector and its practice of carrying   29 
government debt instrument portfolios. Main igniting factors were the  delays  in  reforming 
the banking sector and the actions that caused the dichotomy in the banking sector to 
come  to  the  surface. This  environment made things extremely difficult for those banks 
that had desperately chosen to borrow in short-term maturity and lend to the government in 
relatively longer terms. Things were also difficult for state banks, which were suffering from 
duty  losses.  These  banks  that  had  been  heavily  dependent  on  overnight  funds  found 
themselves in a position not to be able to do business as usual. 
Finally, one should note that the root cause of the banking system fragility was the 
high public sector borrowing requirement and the way it was financed. There was no close 
link  between  rising  deficits  and  inflation,  beginning  as  early  as  the  1990s.  The  main 
reason was that budget deficits were primarily financed  through  government  securities. 
However, the sustainability of this financing mechanism was conditional on the continuation 
of demand for government  securities.  In  the  absence  of  a  program  that  would  have 
reduced  borrowing  requirements,  a  halt  in  demand  would  have  forced  authorities  to 
monetize and hence would have caused a jump in both the exchange rate and the inflation 
rate.  This  led  economic  policymakers  to  try  to  prevent  a  decline  in  the  demand  for 
government  securities.  These  policies,  coupled  with  the  upward  trend  in  banks’ 
government debt instrument portfolios, increased the vulnerability of the banking system. 
The role of monetary policy in risk accumulation in the period preceding the crisis is a topic 
for an upcoming paper. 
Appendix A: Post crisis Period 
Both the Turkish banking system and corporate sector were severely affected by the 
2000–01 crisis. The immediate recapitalization needs of the state- owned banks and the 
banks taken over by the Saving Deposits Insurance Fund led to a jump in the domestic debt 
stock, which was already too high. Mean- while, rapid depreciation of the exchange rate 
had the potential of starting a new inflationary process. Additionally, policymakers lost their 
credibility.  The  undersecretary  of  the  Treasury  resigned,  as  did  the  central  bank’s 
governor. To overcome these problems, Turkey announced a new, IMF-supported program 
in May 2001. The new program had three pillars: fiscal and monetary discipline, structural 
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Table A1: Macroeconomic indicators of the January 2001 - July 2002 period
a 
   Average  Average secondary Average Treasury Eurobond spread Annual inflation Expected year-end  Annual 
  exchange  market interest  Borrowing  (end of period,  rate   inflation rate  industrial production 
Date  rate (lira/dollar)   rate (percent)   rate (percent)  basis points)  (CPI, percent)  (CPI, percent)   growth rate (percent) 
January 2001  672,240  60.1  65.0  729  35.9  n.a.  7.5 
February  739,889  103.1  122.5  936  33.4  n.a.  -4.9 
March  968,299  154.8  193.8  990  37.5  n.a.  -7.6 
April  1,209,865  127.0  130.5  864  48.3  n.a.  -9.6 
May  1,132,510  85.1  82.0  833  52.4  n.a.  -9.4 
June  1,215,605  83.2  88.4  848  56.1  n.a.  -10.1 
July  1,320,506  95.2  91.9  1,021  56.3  n.a.  -11.0 
August  1,400,947  89.1  92.7  904  57.5  63.7  -10.8 
September  1,469,858  87.9  87.6  929  61.8  64.8  -9.2 
October  1,600,157  87.7  86.4  884  66.5  68.4  -13.6 
November  1,521,208  77.6  79.3  755  67.3  72.0  -14.4 
December  1,452,198  72.6  74.1  678  68.5  69.8  -8.1 
January 2002  1,369,182  70.8  71.4  641  73.2  47.3  -2.2 
February  1,349,975  69.6  70.0  640  73.1  47.5  -5.0 
March  1,356,993  65.2  68.5  591  65.1  43.6  19.2 
April  1,317,739  56.6  58.7  577  52.7  37.0  14.8 
May  1,389,555  57.0  55.3  629  46.2  36.7  11.1 
June  1,523,940  69.1  72.3  847  42.6  35.2  7.1 
July  1,649,121  75.4  72.6  912  41.3  35.7  12.4 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey. 
n.a. Not available. 
a. Average figures are the monthly averages of daily data. Eurobond spread is the spread between the thirty-year Turkish Treasury 
eurobond yield and thirty-year U.S. bond yield. Annual figures denote annualized values for the monthly data, that is they are calculated 
as [(X(t)/X(t – 12)) – 1]*100. Expected inflation data come from the biweekly survey of the Central Bank of Turkey. 
Based  on  the  2001–03  program,  economic  fundamentals  continuously 
improved.  However,  up  to  October  2001  the  markets’  reaction  was  not  in  line  with 
fundamentals. The situation  was reversed in the October 2001–May 2002  period.  The 
nominal  exchange  rate,  inflation  rate,  interest  rate,  and Turkish eurobonds spreads all 
followed  a  significant  downward  trend.  With  the  surge  in  political  uncertainty  at  the 
beginning  of  May  2002,  which  was  perceived  by  market  participants  as  policy 
uncertainty, this positive stance began to change (table A-1). 
The key to understanding these contrasting phenomena is the high ratio of domestic 
public debt to GDP and the issue of its sustainability. The imposed fiscal and monetary 
discipline  of  the  program  and  the  accompanying  structural  reforms  notwithstanding, 
reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio to manageable levels requires a considerable time period. In 
the interim period, such an economy is vulnerable to changes in market sentiment, which   31 
increases concerns about  the  debt  sustainability.  Such  a  high  level  of  debt  raises  the 
possibility  of  multiple  equilibria.  Given  the  macroeconomic  fundamentals,  the  type  of 
equilibrium  in  which  the  economy  is  in,  or  approaching,  is  mainly  determined  by 
expectations.
34 Negative expectations can lead an economy to a “bad” equilibrium, at which 
the rates of inflation, interest, and exchange are all high. Positive expectations will yield a 
“good” equilibrium. Based on this possibility, one should look at both fundamentals and 
expectations. 
Fundamentals and Expectations: May 2001–October 2001 
Right after the twin crises, Turkey took key structural reform measures: 
￿￿ “Bad”  banks  were  taken  over  by  the  SDIF  and  excluded  from  the  banking 
system. 
￿￿ The overnight borrowing of these excluded banks was significantly reduced, 
and some of the banks were recapitalized or merged, or both, while some were 
actually sold. 
￿￿ There was a dramatic change in the governance structure of state-owned banks. 
Accumulated  debts  of  the Treasury  to  these  banks were paid and the state 
banks were recapitalized. 
￿￿ A politically independent board of directors was appointed. The board’s mandate 
was specified as protecting the interests of depositors. 
￿￿ A new management for these state banks was appointed, and the number of 
branches  and  employees  were  significantly  reduced  according  to  an 
operational restructuring plan. 
￿￿ In  May  2001  the  central  bank  law  was  changed  and  the  bank  gained  “tool 
independence.” The law explicitly stated that the main goal of the bank is price 
stability. 
￿￿ In addition to structural reforms, both the fiscal and monetary policies remained 
on track. 
However, excluding a few weeks from prior to the September 11 terrorist attack in 
the United States and up to mid-October, market expectations were not in line with the 
                                                
34 See, for example, Calvo (1988).   32 
improvement in fundamentals. The interest rate stayed at a high level. The exchange rate 
followed an upward trend. The spread of the Turkish Treasury bond stayed at high levels 
(see table A-1). That is, the Turkish economy was at a bad equilibrium. But why? 
There were at least four factors hampering gains in policy credibility: First, some 
political  developments—that is, disputes among the coalition parties regarding some of 
the  structural  reforms—increased  doubts  about  the  continuation  of  the  program  and 
raised  the  tensions  in  the  market.  Second,  as documented in this paper, the financial 
sector had a significant amount of open foreign exchange position before the crisis—that is, 
the sharp depreciation of Turkish lira did have an adverse impact on the balance sheets 
of  the  entire  banking  system.  Third,  there  were  external  shocks,  namely,  negative 
developments in Argentina were thought to have the potential for a contagion effect on 
Turkey. Fourth, the exchange rate regime was radically altered and economic agents were 
not familiar with a floating exchange rate regime environment. 
These  developments  led  to  negative  expectations  by  the  markets,  as  the 
sustainability  of  public  debt  was  continuously  questioned.  There  was  a  vicious  cycle: 
despite  improving  macroeconomic  fundamentals,  negative  expectations were pushing 
the economy to a bad equilibrium. That bad equilibrium, in turn, was validating negative 
expectations. In early August the exchange rate volatility started to decline, and this was 
seen as a positive sign for gains in policy credibility. However, the tragic events of September 
11 reversed market sentiment. In just a few days time, interest rates increased by some 
fifteen percentage points and the Turkish lira depreciated considerably. Once again, the 
sustainability of the program began to be questioned. 
Changing Market Sentiment: October 2001–May 2002 
This worsening trend halted as it became evident that Turkey was going to further 
strengthen the ongoing  program by additional structural fiscal measures and a banking 
sector recapitalization program aiming for a quick recovery of sound banks. Also, there was 
the additional credit line from the IMF. The government  announced  its primary  surplus 
target for 2002 as 6.5 percent of GDP. This announcement was found credible by market 
participants, since it became evident that the ambitious primary budget surplus target of 
6.5 per- cent of GNP for 2001 was, in fact, going to be met. In addition, developments in the 
central bank’s balance sheet were in line with the constraints agreed to by the IMF. One 
should also add to these positive developments the fact that the political disputes among   33 
the coalition parties were finally out of the picture. There were other contributing factors as 
well, listed below: 
￿￿ First,  the  fundamental  differences  between  the  Argentine  and  Turkish 
economies, such as the exchange rate regimes and the fiscal policies, became 
more apparent. 
￿￿ Second, it was understood that the Turkish economy was going to register an 
important amount of current account surplus. 
￿￿ Third, banks started to partially roll over their foreign credits. 
￿￿ Fourth, the economic agents began to get used to the mechanics of the floating 
exchange rate regime and, since the beginning of August, the central bank’s 
intervention in the foreign exchange market had been almost nil. 
￿￿ Fifth, the structural reforms in the public sector were continued. 
￿￿ Sixth,  to  finalize  the  restructuring  of  the  financial  sector,  in  February 2002 a 
recapitalization law was passed. In May 2002 all capital-deficient private banks 
presented their detailed capital strengthening plans to the Banking Regulation 
and Supervision Agency. 
￿￿ Seventh, at the beginning of 2002, a debt management law, designed like a fiscal 
responsibility act, was enacted by parliament. All these measures helped the 
market understand that the authorities maintained a disinflation objective. 
Consequently, the nominal exchange rate followed an almost continuously declining 
trend from mid-October up to the beginning of May 2002. A similar phenomenon was also 
observed in the interest rates. In March 2002, for the first time since the eruption of the 
crisis, the industrial production index showed positive growth. This growth stance continued 
in the following months, indicating that a significant output recovery process was under way. 
Inflation that was 68 percent at the end of 2001 started to decline and reached a level of 
41  percent  in  annualized  terms  in  July.  Moreover,  the  gap  between  the  inflationary 
expectations and the year-end target for 2002 continuously narrowed,  also indicating a 
build-up of confidence and policy credibility. A similar phenomenon was also observed in 
the Turkish Treasury eurobond spreads (see table A-1). 
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Political and Policy Uncertainty 
From the beginning of May, two negative developments occurred in the political 
arena. First, the prime minister was hospitalized and there were wide- spread rumors about 
his health. This was considered lethal to political stability, as it led to the possibility of a 
meltdown in his party—the party with the largest representation  in  a  three-party  coalition 
government. Second, discussions about the necessary steps that should be taken to meet 
the Copenhagen criteria—which would start the negotiation process for possible European 
Union  accession—started  to  undermine  the  unity  of  the  coalition  government.  The 
resulting political uncertainty led to an environment of policy uncertainty. Although there 
was no change in the fiscal and monetary policy stance, as of the beginning of May 2002, 
interest  rate,  exchange  rate,  and  Treasury  spreads  once  again  started  to  deteriorate, 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Exchange Market Pressure Index, 1990-2001
a 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on data obtained from Central Bank of Turkey, Electronic Data Delivery System, 
www.tcmb.gov.tr. 
a. Dashed lines indicate mean and mean plus two standard deviations. 
Figure 2. Daily Exchange Rate, Lira-Dollar, 1999–2001 
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Figure 3. Weighted Average Overnight Rate, Daily Data, 1991–2001 
Percent (logarithmic scale, uncompounded) 
 






Figure 4. Foreign Exchange Reserves of the Central Bank, Weekly Data, 1999–2001 
Billions of dollars 
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Figure 5. Price of the Turkish Thirty-Year Eurobond, Daily Data, 2000–01 
Dollars 
Source: Bloomberg System. 
a. As of January 11, 2000. 










July 2000 Jan.2001 July 2001 Dec. 2001b  38 
References 
Akyüz, Yilmaz,  and  Korbut  Boratav.  2001.  “The  Making  of  the  Turkish  Financial  Crisis.”  Paper 
prepared  for  Conference  on  Financialization  of  the  Golabal  Economy.  University  of 
Massachusetts, December 7–9. 
Alper, C. Emre. 2001. “The Turkish Liquidity Crisis of 2000: What Went Wrong?” Russian and East 
European Finance and Trade 37 (6): 51–71. 
Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo. 2001. “Prospective Deficits and the Asian 
Currency Crisis.” Journal of Political Economy 109 (6): 1155–97. 
Calvo,  Guillermo  A.  1988.  “Servicing  the  Public  Debt:  The  Role  of  Expectations.”  American 
Economic Review 78 (4): 647–61. 
———. 1994. “Comments on Dornbusch and Werner.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 
298–300. 
Calvo, Guillermo A., and Carlos A. Végh. 1999. “Inflation Stabilization and BOP Crises in Developing 
Countries.” In Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1C, edited by John B. Taylor and Michael 
Woodford, 1531–614. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Central  Bank  of  Turkey.  2001.  Annual  Report  2001.  Ankara  (www.tcmb.gov.tr/new/ 
evds/yayin/yay1eng.html). 
Chang, Roberto, and Andres Velasco. 1998a. “The Asian Liquidity Crisis.” Working Paper W67961. 
Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research (November). 
———. 1998b. “Financial Crisis in Emerging Markets: A Canonical Model.” Working Paper 6606. 
Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research (June).  
Eichengreen, Barry. 2001. “Crisis Prevention and Management: Any New Lessons from Argentina 
and Turkey?” Background paper for the World Bank’s Global Development Finance 2002. 
Eichengreen, Barry, Andrew K. Rose, and Charles Wyplosz. 1995. “Exchange Market Mayhem: 
The Antecedents and Aftermath of Speculative Attacks.” Economic Policy 21: 251–312. 
Flood, Robert P., and Peter M. Garber. 1984. “Collapsing Exchange Rate Regimes: Some Linear 
Examples.” Journal of International Economics 17: 1–13.  
Flood, Robert P., and Nancy. P. Marion. 2000. “Self-Fulfilling Risk Predictions: An Application  to 
Speculative Attacks.” Journal of International Economics 50: 245–68. 
Frankel,  Jeffrey A.,  and Andrew  K.  Rose.  1996.  “Currency  Crashes  in  Emerging  Markets:  An 
Empirical Treatment.” Journal of International Economics 41: 351–66. 
Ghosh,  Atish  R.,  Anne-Marie  Gulde,  and  Holger  C.  Wolf.  2003.  Exchange  Rate  Regimes: 
Choices and Consequences. MIT Press. 
Goldfajn, Ilan, and Roberto Rigobon. 2000. “Hard Currency and Financial Development.” Working 
Paper 438. Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janerio. 
Johnson,  Simon,  and  others.  2000.  “Tunneling.”  American  Economic  Review,  Papers  and 
Proceedings 90: 22–27. 
Krugman, Paul. 1979. “A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises.” Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking 11: 311–25. 
———.  1999a.  “Balance  Sheets,  the  Transfer  Problem,  and  Financial  Crises.”  In International 
Finance  and  Financial  Crisis,  edited  by  P.  Isard, A.  Razin,  and Andrew Rose, 31–44. New 
York: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
———. 1999b. “Analytical Afterthoughts on the Asian Crisis.” Mimeo. Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology.   39 
Özatay, Fatih. 2000. “The 1994 Currency Crisis in Turkey.” Journal of Policy Reform 3 (4): 327–52. 
Sachs, Jeffrey, Aaron Tornell, and Andres Velasco. 1996a. “Financial Crisis in Emerging Markets: The 
Lessons from 1995.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 147–215. 
———.  1996b.  “The  Collapse  of  the  Mexican  Peso:  What  Have  We  Learned?”  
Economic Policy 22: 15–63. 